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BRINGING DOWN BROWN: SUPER 
PRECEDENTS, MYTHS OF REDISCOVERY, 
AND THE RETROACTIVE CANONIZATION 
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Matthew E. K. Hall* 
INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2007 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1.1 The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, ruled that the race-
conscious student assignment processes in the Seattle and 
Louisville school districts were not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest as required by the Equal 
Protection Clause.2 The plurality opinion by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Thomas’s concurrence, and the dissents by 
Justices Stevens and Breyer all purported to follow the principles 
established by the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.3 According to the Chief Justice’s opinion, even “[t]he 
parties and their amici debate[d] which side is more faithful to 
the heritage of Brown.”4 After noting this fact, the Chief Justice 
then proceeded to enlist language from the Brown decision to 
buttress his own position.5 Justice Thomas attacked the 
                                                          
* Matthew Hall is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Law at 
Saint Louis University. Special thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Laura Beth 
Nielsen, and Chad Flanders for their helpful feedback and suggestions in the 
development of this manuscript. 
1 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
2 Id. at 730. 
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 747. 
5 Id. (“The position of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their 
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dissenters by suggesting that their approach was “reminiscent of 
that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board of 
Education” and “replicates” the arguments rejected in Brown 
“to a distressing extent.”67 Justice Stevens countered by claiming 
that the majority opinion was not “loyal to Brown,” and Justice 
Breyer lamented that the majority “undermines Brown’s promise 
of integrated primary and secondary education.”8 
The Court’s ruling was surrounded by bitter disagreement, 
but on one point, it seemed almost all could agree: an 
appropriate ruling must not simply be faithful to the Fourteenth 
Amendment; it must also be faithful to Brown.  Brown’s 
legitimacy could not be seriously questioned. The decision had 
become more than an interpretation of the Constitution; it had 
become a constitutional text to be interpreted. It had become 
what some would call a “super precedent.”9 
In the recent confirmation hearings for John Roberts and 
Samuel Alito, Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, devoted considerable attention to the notion of super 
                                                          
brief and could not have been clearer: ‘The Fourteenth Amendment prevents 
states from according differential treatment to American children on the basis 
of their color or race.’ What do the racial classifications at issue here do, if 
not accord differential treatment on the basis of race? As counsel who 
appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs in Brown put it: ‘We have one 
fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this 
argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the 
equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor 
in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.’ There is no 
ambiguity in that statement. And it was that position that prevailed in this 
Court, which emphasized in its remedial opinion that what was ‘at stake is 
the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as 
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,’ and what was required was 
‘determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis.’ What do 
the racial classifications do in these cases, if not determine admission to a 
public school on a racial basis?”). 
6 Id. at 748. 
7 Id. at 774. 
8 Id. at 803. 
9 The term “super-precedent” was first used in William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976). 
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precedents in constitutional law.10 Following these hearings, the 
concept has come under extended scrutiny by constitutional 
scholars.11 The term is generally understood to refer to cases that 
are so entrenched in the law and the legal culture that they can 
never or should never be reconsidered or overruled.12 The use of 
the term in this high profile venue raises numerous questions: 
Do certain decisions truly function as super precedents in our 
legal system? If so, why? Which decisions become super 
precedents, and how do we know a super precedent when we 
see one? These questions have sparked heated debate, both 
inside and outside the Senate Judiciary Committee.13 The notion 
of super precedents raises serious objections, and those who 
believe that super precedents exist often disagree about which 
cases belong in such a prestigious category.14 But on one point 
                                                          
10 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito to be 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 321 (2006) (Statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter, Chairman of S. Comm. On the Judiciary) (inquiring whether Alito 
agreed “that Casey is a super precedent or a super stare decisis as Judge 
Luttig said”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, 
Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144–45 (2005) [hereinafter 
Confirmation of John G. Roberts] (Statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (asking Judge Roberts whether Roe 
qualified as a “super-duper precedent in light . . . of 38 occasions to overrule 
it”). 
11 See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super 
Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 
1241–42 (2006); Daniel Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 
90 MINN. L.  REV. 1173, 1180 (2006); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super 
Precedent, 90 MINN. L.  REV. 1204 (2006); Michael Sinclair, Precedent, 
Super Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 365 (2007). 
12 See Sinclair, supra note 11, at 365 (calling a super-precedent a case 
that is “judicially unshakable, a precedential monument which may not be 
gainsaid, akin to having the statute-like force of vertical stare decisis 
horizontally”); Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1205–06 (“Super precedents are 
the constitutional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable issue for 
courts to decide.”). 
13 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra section I.B. for competing arguments about which cases 
qualify as super precedents.  
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senators and scholars seem to agree: if there are super 
precedents in American constitutional law, Brown v. Board of 
Education is one of them.15 
Politicians, judges, and legal scholars of all ideological 
stripes hail Brown as a momentous decision in the history of the 
Supreme Court. In the words of one Court historian, 
constitutional scholars have “lavished” attention on the 
“celebrated decision” which has achieved “iconic status in 
American legal culture.”16 Scholars repeatedly list Brown as the 
quintessential super precedent.17  In search of canonical texts to 
articulate the meaning of the civil rights movement, one article 
begins by simply assuming Brown’s inclusion.18  
From one perspective, Brown’s exalted status should not be 
surprising. The decision marked a radical break from the 
Court’s previous segregation rulings. In fact, in John Robert’s 
confirmation hearings, Brown was repeatedly cited as a 
cautionary tale against absolute adherence to stare decisis.19 
Even more importantly, Brown is closely associated with the 
civil rights movement, which is arguably the most important 
social, political, and legal change of the last half century.20 
                                                          
15 See infra notes 73, 81, 84 and accompanying text. 
16 Jeffrey Hockett, The Battle Over Brown’s Legitimacy, 28 J. SUP. CT. 
HIST. 30 (2003). 
17 See infra notes 73, 81, 84 and accompanying text. 
18 Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights 
Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2009). 
19 See Confirmation Hearing of John G. Roberts, supra note 10, at 144 
(statement of Judge John Roberts) (while John Roberts recognized that “[a]n 
overruling of a prior precedent . . . is inconsistent with principles of 
stability,” he stated that “the principles of stare decisis recognize that there 
are situations when that’s a price that has to be paid. Obviously, Brown v. 
Board of Education is a leading example, overruling Plessy v. Ferguson”). 
20 The Court’s decision in Brown has been frequently cited as an 
extremely important social, political, and legal event. See generally, e.g., 
Richard Thompson Ford, Brown’s Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1305 
(2004); Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education at 50: The 
Multiple Legacies for Policy and Administration, 64 PUB. ADMIN. 270 
(2004); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: 
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (2004); 
Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of 
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Yet, from another perspective, Brown’s iconic status is 
puzzling. The legitimacy of the opinion was seriously questioned 
when it was written by segregationists and integrationists alike.21 
As late as 1959, five years after the Court handed down its 
opinion, a law professor speaking at Harvard Law School 
questioned the principles used by the Court in its decision.22 If 
Brown’s legitimacy was so seriously contested when it was 
handed down and for years after, how has it become so 
enshrined in the legal culture as to serve as the quintessential 
candidate for super precedent status? 
The questions surrounding Brown’s legitimacy were squarely 
put to rest by the civil rights movement of the 1960s. To 
challenge Brown today is to challenge the legitimacy of that 
movement, a position considered well outside the legal and 
political mainstream.23 The decision has come to symbolize the 
essence of the civil rights movement that was endorsed by the 
American public during the social and political transformation of 
                                                          
Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991). 
21 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1737, 1790 (2007) (noting Herbert Wechsler’s point that “continuing dissent 
to Brown was not the monopoly of segregationist bitter-enders, but was a 
serious option for mainstream professionals”); see also Gerhardt, supra note 
11, at 1215. 
22 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Wechsler questions whether the Brown decision 
was based on neutral principles. 
23 See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1752 (“[N]o Supreme Court nominee 
could be confirmed if he refused to embrace Brown.”); Hockett, supra note 
16, at 49 (referencing “[t]he near-universal agreement regarding Brown’s 
greatness and the invective visited upon those few individuals who would 
question the legitimacy of the decision.” However, Hockett emphasizes that 
Brown is still the subject of scholarly controversy). Several scholars have 
questioned the methods and reasoning the Court employed in the Brown 
decision. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, ET. AL., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS 
REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin, 
ed., 2002). Nonetheless, the existence of such critiques only highlights the 
almost universal acceptance of the desegregation movement Brown 
symbolizes as today’s legal scholars consider how the justices may have more 
effectively pursued this ideal.  
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the 1960s.24 Scholars, politicians, and the public treat the Brown 
decision as if it embodies the principles established by the civil 
rights revolution, but this belief is deeply flawed. 
Despite the common acceptance of the Brown decision, 
scholars and judges differ considerably in their interpretation of 
its meaning. These divergent interpretations were highlighted in 
the Parents25 case. According to Chief Justice Roberts, 
[i]n Brown v. Board of Education, we held that 
segregation deprived black children of equal educational 
opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and 
other tangible factors were equal, because government 
classification and separation on grounds of race 
themselves denoted inferiority. It was not the inequality 
of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children 
on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a 
constitutional violation in 1954. The next Term, we 
accordingly stated that “full compliance” with Brown I 
required school districts “to achieve a system of 
determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis.”26 
In other words, on the Chief Justice’s view, Brown 
vindicated anticlassification principles—the notion that 
“government may not classify on the basis of race.”27 
The Chief Justice’s opinion draws on a long tradition of 
cases applying anticlassification logic to invalidate racial 
discrimination. This principle was first employed as early as 
1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,28 though for the next eighty years it 
was unevenly and unpredictably applied. Perhaps the clearest 
articulations of the anticlassification principle between Yick Wo 
                                                          
24 See generally Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1763–92; Ackerman & 
Nou, supra note 18, at 63–65. 
25 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 746–48 (2007). 
26 Id. at 746–47 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
27 Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 
1470 (2004). 
28 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886). 
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and the 1960s appeared in cases upholding discriminatory 
treatment of citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II. 
In these cases, the Court ruled that “[d]istinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry are, by their very 
nature, odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
upon the doctrine of equality,”29 and that “all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect.”30 The application of anticlassification 
principles became formalized in the 1960s, when the Court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment “renders racial classifications 
‘constitutionally suspect,’ and subject to the ‘most rigid 
scrutiny,’ and, ‘in most circumstances irrelevant’ to any 
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.”31 In the decades 
that followed, the Court relied on this anticlassification 
framework to invalidate numerous policies extending preferential 
treatment to members of disadvantaged racial minorities.32 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Parents advanced a 
strikingly different assessment of Brown’s meaning, arguing that 
the decision “promised” to bring about “racially integrated 
education.”33 On this view, 
[t]he Equal Protection Clause, ratified following the Civil 
War, has always distinguished in practice between state 
action that excludes and thereby subordinates racial 
minorities and state action that seeks to bring together 
people of all races . . . . The plurality cites in support 
those who argued in Brown against segregation . . . . But 
segregation policies did not simply tell schoolchildren 
“where they could and could not go to school based on 
the color of their skin;” they perpetuated a caste system 
                                                          
29 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
30 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
31 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
32 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Adarand Constructors 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978). 
33 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 803 (2007). 
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rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of 
legalized subordination.34 
Rather than articulating anticlassification principles, Justice 
Breyer understood Brown as supporting antisubordination 
principles: “the conviction that it is wrong for the state to 
engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of 
historically oppressed groups.”35 
Justice Breyer’s arguments find strong support in the text of 
the Brown opinion. Chief Justice Warren’s decision firmly 
embraced antisubordination principles by focusing on 
segregation’s tendency to be “interpreted as denoting inferiority 
of the negro group” and “generate[] a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community.”36 Conspicuously absent from the 
Brown opinion is any mention of racial classification or the strict 
scrutiny standard articulated in Hirabayashi v. United States and 
Korematsu v. United States. 
This contrast between Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and 
Justice Breyer’s opinion reflects a common point of conflict in 
the academic understanding of equal protection jurisprudence. 
Beginning with Own Fiss’s seminal article in 1976, Groups and 
the Equal Protection Clause,37 scholars have come to understand 
the competition between anticlassification and antisubordination 
as the fundamental debate underlying the interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Although some participants in this 
debate contend that Brown has always stood for anticlassification 
principles,38 most agree that the opinion vindicates 
antisubordination values.39 On this latter reading, only years 
                                                          
34 Id. at  864–67.  
35 See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1472–73. 
36 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 
483, 494 (1954). 
37 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). Fiss’ article posed a serious challenge to the 
predominant anticlassification paradigm by advancing the antisubordination 
paradigm. 
38 See William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The 
Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 997–98 (1984). 
39 See Robert A. Burt, The Sit-In Cases and the Constitutional 
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after Brown did anticlassification principles gain wide acceptance 
as judges and politicians began to recognize the political and 
jurisprudential advantages of accepting this framework.40 
Why do judges and academics differ so dramatically in their 
interpretation of Brown? If Brown’s importance and legitimacy 
are so universally accepted, why is the meaning of the opinion 
so hotly contested? From where do these conflicting 
interpretations originate? I argue that the justices in Parents and 
the numerous academics who participate in this debate reach 
divergent conclusions about the meaning of Brown because 
proponents of both views subscribe to a “myth of 
rediscovery”—a common understanding in the legal-academic 
community about the meaning of a text and its origin in our 
history that is widely accepted, but is not based on historical 
fact.41 Myths of rediscovery provide coherent, if limited, 
descriptions of American political and constitutional 
development in service of particular policy aims; however, these 
myths frequently produce more confusion than clarity for 
understanding constitutional meaning.42 
In this instance, the myth to which judges and academics 
cling is the widely accepted notion that Brown articulates an 
unquestionable principle of constitutional law, though adherents 
to the myth disagree about what that principle is. In a desperate 
                                                          
Legitimation of the Civil Rights Act 90 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Journal of Law and Policy); Fiss, supra note 37; Neil Gotanda, 
A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47 
(1991); Randall Kennedy, Commentary, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment 
on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1337 (1986); 
Siegel, supra note 27, at 1481; William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, 
the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 783 
(1979). 
40 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights 
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 
29 (2003); Fiss, supra note 37, at 118–28; Siegel, supra note 27, at 1498–
1520. 
41 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 259 (1998) 
[hereinafter TRANSFORMATIONS]. 
42 See generally Ackerman, supra note 21 (discussing the resistance to 
Brown among both segregationists and mainstream professionals). 
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attempt to salvage this myth, judges, lawyers, and academics 
construct competing historical narratives linking together Brown 
v. Board of Education, subsequent equal protection cases, the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the legislation spawned 
by that movement.43 Although many of these narratives are 
fascinating, the perpetuation of this ahistorical myth has 
hindered and confused the debate between anticlassification and 
antisubordination principles.   
This article argues that Brown v. Board of Education has 
been mistakenly, retroactively canonized to fill the void of 
judicial articulation for the civil rights movement of the 1960s. 
Although Brown was certainly decided correctly from a moral 
perspective and probably decided correctly from a 
jurisprudential perspective, its iconic status in American law is 
dependent on the myth of its role as an articulation of the 
popular movement that established civil rights in the United 
States. The perpetuation of this myth obscures the meaning of 
Brown, as well as the constitutional principles embraced by the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s; the myth forces Chief 
Justice Roberts to artificially read anticlassification principles 
into the Brown decision and allows Justice Breyer to 
inappropriately claim super precedent status for 
antisubordination principles. I do not question the legitimacy or 
value of the Brown ruling; I simply argue that Brown should not 
be considered a super precedent. The case’s importance should 
be de-emphasized relative to other important acts of 
constitutional politics, such as the sit-in protests of the early 
1960s,44 Martin Luther King’s I Have a Dream speech,45 and, 
most importantly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.46 
Part I of this article begins by considering the fundamental 
                                                          
43 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 21 (incorporating Brown into such a 
narrative); Balkin & Siegel, supra note 40 (integrating Brown into a larger 
antisubordination narrative); Reynolds, supra note 33 (incorporating Brown 
into a larger anticlassification narrative). 
44 See Burt, supra note 39. 
45 See DREW D. HANSEN, THE DREAM: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND 
THE SPEECH THAT INSPIRED A NATION 97 (Ecco 2003). 
46 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
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authority of the courts to interpret the constitution. The Supreme 
Court’s legitimacy in handing down a controversial opinion such 
as Brown rests on the notion that the Court is enforcing 
principles established by the people in a process, which is 
widely recognized as constitutional decision-making. If there are 
“super precedents” in American constitutional law—decisions 
which deserve a heightened degree of deference as precedents—
the existence of these super precedents can only be justified by 
their relation to such acts of higher lawmaking. Although Brown 
is frequently cited as an example of a super precedent due to its 
alleged association with the Reconstruction movement of the 
1860s or the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Part II of this 
article argues that neither of these interpretations is correct, 
because Brown was not the articulation of a popular process of 
higher lawmaking. Instead, Part III argues that when looking for 
writings that illuminate the meaning of the civil rights movement 
in the constitutional canon, we should look beyond court cases 
to other artifacts of constitutional change. In Part IV, I examine 
some of these alternate canonical texts, which suggest that the 
myth of Brown’s super precedent status has obscured the true 
nature of the debate between antisubordination and 
anticlassification principles. Part V explores the negative 
ramifications of Brown’s misclassification as a super precedent.  
I. DUALIST DEMOCRACY AND SUPER PRECEDENTS 
A. The Role of Judicial Review in Constitutional Democracy 
Establishing criteria for identifying super precedents requires 
an examination of the justification for judicial review itself. The 
process of judicial review is certainly anomalous in a 
democracy. Why, in a system of government founded on the 
will of the people, should unelected judges serving life terms be 
empowered to strike down laws and practices enacted through 
the democratic process? Famously dubbed the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” by Alexander Bickel,47 this fundamental 
                                                          
47 See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: 
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dilemma in the American legal system has received persistent 
and focused attention from legal philosophers and democratic 
theorists.48 A wide range of answers has been advanced to 
resolve this “difficulty,” but most of these solutions attempt to 
link judicial review to a theory of constitutionalism rooted in 
popular sovereignty. 
Alexander Hamilton offered the original justification for 
judicial review in Federalist 78.49 There he argues that courts are 
responsible for interpreting and applying all laws, both those 
enacted by a legislature and the Constitution itself.50 If an act of 
the legislature conflicts with a provision of the Constitution, the 
Constitution must be given priority because legislators are 
simply the agents of the people, whereas the Constitution was 
created by the people themselves: “The Constitution ought to be 
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the 
intention of their agents.”51 In other words, judicial review is 
legitimate in a democracy because constitutional commands 
represent a more accurate reflection of the people’s will than do 
mere statutes. From this perspective, judicial review is not an 
undemocratic process, but a more democratic process; the will 
of the people is preferred over the will of lawmakers. 
The role of popular sovereignty is at the center of many 
theories of constitutional law. For example, Keith Whittington 
argues for an originalist interpretation of the constitution as the 
                                                          
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS (Josephine A. 
Bickel ed., Yale Univ. Press 2 ed.,1986) (1962). 
48 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); 
CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2007) 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2001); Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative 
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Keith 
Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the 
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005). 
49 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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enduring embodiment of the people’s will.52 For Whittington, the 
Constitution’s authority is founded on the notion of “potential 
sovereignty.”53 This idea does not assume that the people would 
consent to the Constitution if asked; it simply contends that the 
Constitution is the last and only legitimate expression of the 
people’s will until the next express act of constitutional 
revision.54 Whittington calls this dichotomy “democratic 
dualism.”55 The sovereign people do not always exist; they 
emerge at certain times to deliberate and express their will as 
constitutional decision-making.56 
Even drastically different approaches to constitutional 
interpretation rely on the authority of the framers for democratic 
accountability. For example, Sotirios Barber contends that the 
Constitution should be read through an “aspirational approach” 
that is aimed at achieving the aspirations of the framers 
embodied in the text to form the best possible society.57 Jed 
Rubenfeld claims that constitutionalism is the practice through 
which a democratic nation governs itself by making and keeping 
commitments over time, despite differing preferences among 
temporary majorities at one particular moment.58 For Rubenfeld, 
the Constitution embodies the will of the people, expressed as a 
self-commitment that binds the people because of its necessity 
for popular self-government.59 Both Barber and Rubenfeld 
present theories of constitutional change that permit courts to 
legitimately extend constitutional obligations apart from any 
popular movement. This feature of their theories separates them 
from pure dualist theories; however, it is important to note that 
even they reach back to popular movements for some basis of 
democratic legitimacy. 
                                                          
52 See generally CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 48. 
53 Id. at 129. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 135.  
56 Id.  
57 SOTIRIOS BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 76 (1986). 
58 JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY (2005). 
59 Id. at 89 (“Self-government, on this view, requires a practice of 
making and keeping commitments.”). 
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Bruce Ackerman also supports an understanding of American 
government as a dualist democracy.60 However, Ackerman’s 
theory differs significantly from Whittington’s because 
Ackerman recognizes that constitutional transformations can 
occur through both formal and informal tracks of higher 
lawmaking.61 The formal track is the Article V amendment 
process envisioned by the framers.62 The informal track is a five-
stage process in which political elites enter into a dialogue with 
ordinary people in order to reach and express a new 
constitutional decision. These five stages are: (1) a popular 
movement signals its intention to break with the constitutional 
status quo, (2) reformers propose a specific plan for change, 
(3) the people trigger the change by supporting reformers who 
then challenge dissenting institutions, (4) the plan is brought to 
the people for final ratification, and (5) the advocates of change 
consolidate the “constitutional moment” by coercing dissenting 
institutions.63 
B. Popular Decision-Making and Criteria for Super 
Precedents  
Each of the theories discussed above suggests that the 
legitimacy of judicial action rests on its connection to the will of 
the people themselves. Therefore, if there are super precedents 
in American constitutional law—judicial decisions that deserve 
special deference from future judges, lawyers, politicians, 
academics, and publics—then the authority of these super 
precedents can only be justified by an especially close 
connection between these rulings and willful acts of higher 
lawmaking by the American people. By reframing the definition 
of super precedents as judicial articulations of popular 
constitutional decision-making, I develop new criteria for 
evaluating which decisions deserve this special status. 
                                                          
60 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
(1991) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]; TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41. 
61 TRANSFOMATIONS, supra note 41, at 3–31. 
62 Id. at 15. 
63 Id. at 17–23. 
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To begin, I should point out a potential circularity, which is 
apt to appear in any discussion of super precedents. If super 
precedents are defined as cases which enjoy great popular 
support, then the process of categorizing a case as a super 
precedent is as simple as reading a public opinion poll asking 
which Supreme Court cases are most important. The definition 
quickly becomes circular: super precedents are cases that are 
popular; therefore, cases that are popular are super precedents. 
In order to avoid this circularity we must distinguish between a 
descriptive canon (those cases which currently enjoy super 
precedent status) and a prescriptive canon (those cases which 
should, by some objective criteria, be categorized as super 
precedents). Scholars may disagree about what criteria to use, 
but if we wish to pursue a set of objective criteria to establish 
which cases should, or should not, be considered super 
precedents, we must be prepared to conclude that some cases 
currently enjoying widespread support may not qualify and some 
cases may qualify which do not enjoy such support. This point is 
critical to my argument. I believe Brown v. Board of Education 
is currently treated as a super precedent, yet does not deserve 
this iconic status. 
What objective standards can we use to identify which cases 
are super precedents? The use of the term in the recent 
confirmation hearings of John Roberts and Samuel Alito has 
prompted a lively discussion of super precedents in legal 
scholarship. This discussion provides a good starting point for a 
working definition of super precedents. 
Michael Gerhardt defines super precedents as “the doctrinal, 
or decisional, foundation for subsequent lines of judicial 
decisions.”64 Their function in the law is to provide structure for 
the development of law: “Super precedents seep into the public 
consciousness, and become a fixture of the legal framework. 
Super precedents are the constitutional decisions whose 
correctness is no longer a viable issue for the courts to 
decide.”65 After discussing what he calls “foundational 
                                                          
64 Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1205. 
65 Id. at 1205–06. 
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institutional practices”66 and “foundational doctrine,”67 Gerhardt 
addresses “foundational decisions” on discrete questions of 
constitutional law.  Gerhardt suggests five criteria for identifying 
these decisions: super precedents are cases  
that (1) have endured over time; (2) political institutions 
repeatedly have endorsed and supported; (3) have 
influenced or shaped doctrine in at least one area of 
constitutional law; (4) have enjoyed, in one form or 
another, widespread social acquiescence; and (5) are 
widely recognized by the courts as no longer meriting the 
expenditure of scarce judicial resources.68 
Gerhardt offers Knox v. Lee,69 The Civil Rights Cases,70 
Washington v. Davis,71 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,72 and Brown v. Board of Education as examples of 
super precedents.73 
Michael Sinclair defines a super precedent as a decision 
which is “judicially unshakable, a precedential monument which 
may not be gainsaid, akin to having the statute-like force of 
vertical stare decisis horizontally.”74 For Sinclair, the main 
                                                          
66 Gerhardt defines “foundational institutional practices” as practices 
which “have become so well entrenched in society . . . that they may be 
undone only through the most extremely radical, unprecedented acts of 
political and judicial will[.]” Id. at 1207–10. Examples include the practice of 
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803) or federal judicial review of state court decisions established in Martin 
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
67 Gerhardt defines “foundational doctrine” as “the support in case law 
for recognizing the existence and application of basic categories, kinds or 
classes of constitutional disputes that endure over time,” such as the 
incorporation doctrine and the rule establishing classical political questions as 
nonjusticiable. Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1210–13. 
68 Id. at 1213. 
69 79 U.S. 457 (1870). 
70 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
71 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
72 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
73 Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1215–17. 
74 Sinclair, supra note 11, at 365. 
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feature of a super precedent is its entrenchment in society.75 
Accordingly, only a dramatic societal change could alter the 
precedent.76 Being upheld by courts over and over again is not a 
sign that a case is a super precedent, because that means it is 
being repeatedly challenged.77 However, frequent citations to a 
case might suggest its super precedent status.78 He suggests 
Marbury v. Madison, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,79 Miranda v. 
Arizona,80 and Brown v. Board of Education as examples.81 
Daniel Farber uses the term “bedrock precedents” instead of 
super precedents, but his meaning is similar.82 Farber defines 
bedrock precedents as “precedents that have become the 
foundation for large areas of important doctrine.”83 He gives as 
examples the New Deal cases upholding federal taxing and 
spending programs and recognizing federal jurisdiction over the 
economy, cases validating the existence of independent agencies, 
decisions incorporating the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the desegregation cases, such as Brown.84 
All of these authors focus on the importance of consistency 
in the law and stability in political institutions. Gerhardt argues 
that “[s]ecuring the permanence of some decisions extends all of 
the institutional values advanced by fidelity to precedent, 
including the preservation of stability and scarce judicial 
resources.”85 Sinclair claims that the most significant benefit of 
stare decisis is the “stability, continuity, and predictability it 
                                                          
75 Id. at 411 (“That some cases should be more solidly ensconced and of 
more determinate consequence than others is hardly surprising. To overrule 
such a case should be viewed by society as particularly momentous and hence 
something to be done circumspectly.”). 
76 Id. at 400. 
77 Id. at 402. 
78 Id. 
79 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
80 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
81 Sinclair, supra note 11, at 400–03. 
82 Farber, supra note 11, at 1175. 
83 Id. at 1180. 
84 Id. 
85 Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1221. 
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lends to the law.”86 Farber echoes this justification.87 For each of 
these authors, super precedents exist as a pragmatic necessity for 
stable government, perhaps reinforced by popular support for 
the decision, but not necessarily as a principled articulation of a 
popular expression of sovereign will. 
Randy Barnett offers a convincing rejoinder to this 
conception of super precedents. Barnett suggests that Gerhardt 
and Farber have committed two logical fallacies: “The first is 
the conflation of the ‘is’ with the ‘ought’; the second is the 
conflation of the ‘actual’ with the ‘necessary’.”88 Barnett argues 
that simply because, as an empirical matter, some cases are not 
going to be reversed anytime soon does not mean that they 
should not be reversed.89 If there ever came a time when a court 
thought it appropriate to overturn a case, the fact that it was 
dubbed a super precedent in the past should not influence the 
court’s decision.  Additionally, even if these cases are not going 
to be reversed, it does not mean that they could not be reversed. 
The factual assumptions underlying the necessity of certain 
judicial decisions can change.90 If these facts change, there is no 
reason a case’s super precedent status—the fact the decision was 
once thought necessary—should limit a court’s options.91 
Barnett also attacks the justification of super precedents 
based on support for the ruling in the public or in the other 
branches of government: “To be sure, some precedents could be 
super, in part, because they are constitutionally correct. I put 
Marbury, Brown, and Griswold into this category. But simply 
identifying these cases as super precedents is no substitute for 
                                                          
86 Sinclair, supra note 11, at 369. 
87 Farber, supra note 11, at 1180 (“One purpose of having a written 
constitution is to create a stable framework for government. This goal would 
be undermined if the Court failed to give special credence to bedrock 
precedents.”). 
88 Barnett, supra note 11, at 1241–42. 
89 Id. at 1241. (“An explanation of why a particular decision will not 
soon be overruled, however . . . is distinct from an argument for why it 
ought not one day be reversed when the time is ripe.”). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1247–48. 
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showing why they are rightly decided.”92 Support for some cases 
might be strong among the public and the legal community, but 
if their normative value is so great, then they should not need 
status as a super precedent. If on the other hand, their normative 
value fails under serious scrutiny, then perhaps they should not 
have been thought a super precedent under this criterion in the 
first place. 
As Barnett points out, the justification of super precedents as 
necessary components of stability or moral imperatives in 
society has serious deficiencies.93 More importantly, though, 
these justifications are incompatible with the justification of 
judicial review itself. We do not have the process of judicial 
review because we trust the courts more than the legislature to 
maintain a stable government or promote morality in society. 
The legitimacy of judicial review relies on the connection 
between the court’s decisions and a previous expression of 
popular will. As such, a tenable theory of super precedents, 
which effectively raises a judicial opinion to the level of a 
constitutional command, must rely on this connection to the 
popular will rather than on a theory of stability or morality. If 
super precedents exist, then their existence can only be justified 
by their relation to a popular constitutional movement. 
Consequently, when determining whether a particular case 
qualifies as a super precedent, we should evaluate its 
relationship to a moment of higher lawmaking. 
As such, I define super precedents as judicial opinions which 
articulate a pronouncement of the popular will. In order for a 
case to qualify as a super precedent, it must be the product of a 
protracted political struggle that engaged the public in a period 
of higher lawmaking. Like Farber and Gerhardt, I believe that 
several historic decisions from the 1930s and 1940s establishing 
the federal government’s authority to regulate the economy and 
upholding new taxing and spending programs qualify as super 
precedents. I base their status as super precedents, not on their 
inherent normative value or their necessity for stable 
                                                          
92 Id. at 1244–45. 
93 Id.  
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government, but rather on their connection to the New Deal 
political and constitutional revolution. However, my definition 
of super precedents leads to different conclusions in many other 
cases. In the next section I will consider its implications for the 
supposedly quintessential super precedent, Brown v. Board of 
Education. 
II. BROWN AS SUPER PRECEDENT 
If Brown’s super precedent status depends on its connection 
to a moment of popular constitutional politics, then in order to 
evaluate this status we must ask, “What constitutional decision is 
articulated in the Brown opinion?” Two potential answers are 
generally advanced in the literature: Brown is either the 
articulation of the post-Civil War Reconstruction movement, 
particularly the movement that supported the Fourteenth 
Amendment,94 or it is the articulation of the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s.95 I will consider each of these 
arguments in turn. 
A. Brown as the Articulation of the Reconstruction Movement 
The defense of Brown as the articulation of the 
Reconstruction Era contends that Warren’s opinion reflected the 
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when it was ratified in 1868.96 The 
originalist argument for Brown, however, finds very little 
support in current literature on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Legal scholars with a wide variety of ideological and 
jurisprudential views agree that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not originally intended to prohibit school segregation.97 
Alexander Bickel, writing shortly after the Brown ruling, 
conducted an extensive review of the history surrounding 
                                                          
94 See infra section II.A. 
95 See infra section II.B. 
96 See generally Michael McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. 
Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2 (1996). 
97 See infra notes 98–109  and accompanying text. 
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passage of the Amendment and concluded that “section I of the 
fourteenth amendment, like section I of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 . . . was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor 
suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation.”98 In a 
critique of Robert Bork’s defense of the Brown ruling, Richard 
Posner echoes this conclusion:  
[O]n a consistent application of originalism [Brown v. 
Board of Education] was decided incorrectly . . . all the 
clause forbids is the selective withdrawal of legal 
protection on racial grounds.  A state cannot make black 
people outlaws by refusing to enforce the state’s criminal 
and tort law when the victims of a crime or tort are 
black.  To the consistent originalist that should be the 
extent of the clause’s reach.99   
Similarly, in their revisionist history of Brown, Mark 
Tushnet and Katya Lezin examine the debates over passage of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and note the “numerous statements 
in the debates in which proponents and opponents of the 
Amendment seemed to agree that the Amendment would not 
affect the states’ ability to segregate public schools; the 
Amendment protected only what they regarded as ‘civil rights’ 
as distinct from political rights, such as voting, and social rights, 
such as education.”100 Lawrence Tribe and Michael Dorf confirm 
this reading: “There is very little doubt that most of [the people 
who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment] assumed that 
segregated schools were, at that time, entirely consistent with 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”101 
Michael McConnell offers an alternate view. He challenges 
“the basic premise that, as a historical matter, segregation did 
not violate the commonly accepted meaning of the Amendment 
                                                          
98 Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955). 
99 Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 
1374 (1990). 
100 Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 20, at 1919. 
101 LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 
12–13 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991). 
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at the time it was drafted and ratified.”102 Rather than focus on 
Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself, McConnell examines evidence 
from the years following passage of the Amendment to show 
that school segregation was not a completely accepted part of 
national life. He concludes that “[a] close examination of the 
debates and votes on segregation between 1870 and 1875 now 
convinces me that Brown v. Board of Education was correctly 
decided on originalist grounds.”103 
McConnell offers an intriguing historical perspective on the 
civil rights debates in congress in the 1870s, but Raoul Berger’s 
convincing rejoinder undermines his argument for an originalist 
grounding for the Brown decision. 104 Because Berger’s critique 
is so thorough, I will only highlight his main conclusions. First, 
Berger challenges McConnell’s use of debates over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875.105 The meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, like the meaning of any text, must be founded on 
the intentions of the authors, rather than later interpreters of the 
text.106 As such, the interpretations adopted by Congress in the 
1870s are irrelevant to a debate over original intent.107 Second, 
all the evidence from the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment supports the claim that it was intended to legalize 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and protect a similar list of specific 
rights, which did not include desegregation.108 Third, 
desegregated schools were not within the meaning of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
                                                          
102 McConnell, supra note 96, at 457. 
103 Id. at 458. 
104 See generally Raoul Berger, The “Original Intent”—As Perceived by 
Michael McConnell, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 242 (1996). 
105 Id. at 245–46. 
106 Id. at 242 (“For centuries ‘original intention’ has meant the 
understanding of the draftsmen, not that of subsequent readers.”). 
107 Id. at 245 (“[T]he words are words of art whose meaning is 
historically confined to the intention of the draftsmen, that is the 1866 
framers; it cannot include later interpretations.”). 
108 See id. at 247–50. 
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Amendment.109 Although McConnell’s argument shows the 
lengths to which originalists will go to justify Brown, the linkage 
between desegregated schools and the Reconstruction movement 
is ultimately unpersuasive. 
B. Brown as the Articulation of the 1960s Civil Rights 
Movement 
Perhaps because arguments connecting Brown to the 
Reconstruction Era operate on such shaky ground, or perhaps 
because the case is so temporally distant from that period, the 
Brown decision is much more frequently framed as connected to 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In their elucidation of 
the super precedent concept, Gerhardt, Farber and Sinclair all 
cite Brown v. Board of Education as a prime example of a super 
precedent (or bedrock precedent), and each of their arguments 
hinge on the opinion’s connection to the popular expression of 
constitutional politics during the 1960s.110 
Gerhardt notes the strong initial backlash after the Brown 
decision, and points out that the debate over school 
desegregation was not truly resolved “until national political 
leaders fell behind Brown in the late 1950s, particularly through 
politically and socially significant legislation such as the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.”111 As further 
evidence of Brown’s super precedent status, Gerhardt points out 
the importance of Supreme Court nominees accepting Brown in 
order to get confirmed.112 While Robert Bork’s criticism of the 
Brown decision caused serious problems for his confirmation, 
Clarence Thomas did not signal any intention to abandon the 
precedent.113 Then, Gerhardt segues back into a discussion of the 
1960s:  
                                                          
109 See id. at 255–59. 
110 See Farber, supra note 11, at 1186; Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1215; 
Sinclair, supra note 11, at 400. 
111 Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1215. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
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Nor, more importantly, did Justice Thomas suggest he 
would call into question the landmark legislation Brown 
and its progeny arguably spawned, including the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act . . . . Subsequent nominees, including Chief Justice 
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, have declared 
unambiguously their fidelity to Brown and to the 
landmark legislation, and thus the precedents upholding 
them, embedding it deeply into American culture, 
society, and constitutional law.114 
Why is the importance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 included in an analysis of Brown? 
What relevance do these acts have in establishing Brown as a 
super precedent? The only plausible explanation for this link is 
the claim that “Brown and its progeny arguably spawned” the 
civil rights legislation of the 1960s.115 Gerhardt is not so subtly 
implying that Brown’s super precedent status is, at least in part, 
dependent on the popular endorsement of its principles in the 
following decade. 
Michael Sinclair echoes the importance of popular support 
for identifying a super precedent.116 Although Sinclair does not 
go into great detail in asserting that Brown deserves this status, 
perhaps assuming the claim is not controversial, his brief 
remarks highlight the importance of subsequent popular opinion 
in verifying the case’s importance: “society now recognizes the 
moral abhorrence of that state of affairs [before Brown], and 
would surely find a return to it socially repulsive.”117 
Farber firmly grounds his defense of Brown’s status on the 
popular ratification of its principles during the 1960s:  
Consideration of nonjudicial precedents also reinforces 
the significance of bedrock precedent. The post-New 
Deal understanding of federal power received the support 
of the President and Congress over a long period of time. 
                                                          
114 Id. at 121–16. 
115 See id. at 1215. 
116 Sinclair, supra note 11, at 400. 
117 Id. 
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So has the racial integration mandate of Brown, which 
was stirringly endorsed by Congress and the President in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These actions by the 
‘democratic branches’ rebuff any argument that these 
precedents represent a judicial power grab, and such 
actions thereby help place the precedents’ legitimacy 
beyond question.118 
On these points Farber is clear: Brown is both legitimate and 
deserving of special deference as a “bedrock precedent” because 
it stands for the decision of the people, as represented by 
Congress and the president, during the 1960s.119 Without these 
endorsements, Brown’s status, and perhaps even its legitimacy, 
would be in question. 
Even Randy Barnett, who disagrees with the value of the 
super precedent concept, points out that if Brown has achieved 
this status it is because of the popular civil rights movement that 
succeeded it: “Brown itself did not spell the end of Jim Crow. 
That took decades of political struggle and physical resistance to 
accomplish, only after which did Brown itself become anything 
like a ‘super precedent.’”120 Once again, for Barnett, it is the 
expression of popular will through political struggle that explains 
and legitimizes Brown’s importance. 
As shown above, both the proponents and opponents of the 
super precedent concept justify Brown’s status by linking it to 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s rather than that of the 
1860s. But this linkage entails several obvious conceptual 
problems: If Brown spoke for a popular movement which was 
yet to occur, must we not conclude that the Brown decision was 
wrong the day it was decided? If the opinion’s legitimacy 
depends on a decision the people made in the 1960s, then how 
could it have been legitimate in 1954? Are we to believe that the 
unanimous Supreme Court was simply wrong from a 
jurisprudential perspective, but nonetheless praiseworthy because 
the people later adopted its principles? 
                                                          
118 Farber, supra note 11, at 1186. 
119 Id. 
120 Barnett, supra note 11, at 1244. 
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In his 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, Bruce 
Ackerman tries to resolve this temporal dilemma and salvage the 
connection between Brown and the civil rights movement by 
describing the decision as the first stage in his five-stage process 
of constitutional transformation.121 Ackerman agrees with 
Brown’s super precedent status and that “Brown’s canonization 
is itself a product of the very same popular sovereignty dynamic 
that gave us the landmark [Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting 
Rights Act of 1965].”122 He contends that the Brown decision 
was the “signal” of the civil rights constitutional movement, 
which “forced the question of equality onto the center of the 
constitutional stage,” by “catalyz[ing] an escalating debate that 
ultimately penetrated the nation’s workplaces and churches, 
breakfast tables and barrooms, in a way that is rare in 
America . . . .”123 
At first, Ackerman’s claim appears plausible; however, upon 
closer reflection it is inconsistent with his own theory of 
constitutional signaling. In Ackerman’s We the People: 
Foundations, he describes the signaling phase of constitutional 
change as an indication that a popular movement enjoys 
“extraordinary support for their initiative in the country at large. 
Extraordinary in three senses: depth, breadth and 
decisiveness.”124 To say that a movement has depth signifies that 
citizens are informed about an issue and have seriously 
considered its implications.125 A movement’s breadth indicates 
that it is supported by a large number of citizens.126 Although 
                                                          
121 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1789. Ackerman lists Brown v. Board of 
Education along with Marbury v. Madison and Wickard v. Filburn as 
examples of super precedents. He reinforces Brown’s importance by asserting 
that “any lawyer or judge who questions Brown’s legitimacy places himself 
outside the jurisprudential mainstream.” Id. 
122 Id. at 1790 (emphasis in original). 
123 Id. at 1763. 
124 TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41, at 272. 
125 Id. at 273–74 (“I shall say that a private citizen’s support is ‘deep’ 
when she has deliberated as much about her commitment to a national ideal 
as she thinks appropriate in making a considered judgment on an important 
decision in her private life.”). 
126 Id. at 274 (“[T]here must be lots and lots of private citizens who think 
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Ackerman is hesitant to specify particular numbers, he suggests 
that for a movement to register a signal, it should have “the 
deep support of 20 percent of the country, and the additional 
support of 31 percent of private citizens.”127 Finally, a 
constitutional initiative must be decisive; that is, “[i]t should be 
in a position to decisively defeat all the plausible alternatives in 
a series of pairwise comparisons.”128 In We the People: 
Transformations, Ackerman lists as examples of such signaling 
events the Mt. Vernon and Annapolis conventions in which 
delegates from several states met and laid the groundwork for 
the Philadelphia convention, the election of Abraham Lincoln in 
1860, the Reconstruction Congress’s radical decision not to seat 
the southern delegates after the Civil War, and the election of 
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932.129 
Each of these examples fit the model of a popular movement 
signaling a radical change in constitutional politics; but how 
does Brown v. Board of Education fit into this framework? A 
Supreme Court decision is hardly a good example of a popular 
movement supported by private citizens signaling an intention to 
initiate change. The justices on the Supreme Court in 1954 were 
appointed by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower—
three Presidents hardly known for their strong stances on civil 
rights and who were certainly not elected by a popular 
movement demanding constitutional transformation in civil rights 
law.130 There were no popular movements in society for which 
the Court might have been speaking.131 As Ackerman himself has 
argued, the dominant constitutional issue on the agenda of the 
American people in the early 1950s was anti-Communism, not 
civil rights.132 
Nor did the Court’s decision prompt any such movement to 
                                                          
that the reform should be taken seriously.”). 
127 Id. at 275 (emphasis in original). 
128 Id. at 277. 
129 Id. at 40–49, 127, 166–73, 281–85. 
130 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1762. 
131 As discussed infra, the popular movement known as the civil rights 
movement did not emerge until 1958 at the earliest. 
132 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 375 (2006). 
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emerge. As Michael Klarman points out, the disconnect between 
the logic of Brown (based on the psychological effects of 
segregated schools on children) and the logic of the Montgomery 
bus boycott (based on fairness, equality, and respect for adult 
African-Americans in public facilities) raises doubts about a 
direct link between these events, and regardless of “whether or 
not Brown inspired the Montgomery bus boycott, it produced no 
general outbreak of direct-action protest in the 1950s.”133 Civil 
rights activism did not emerge as a significant social 
phenomenon until the early 1960s, and then not because of 
Brown’s influence, but because of other factors such as the Cold 
War and the decolonization of Africa.134 
But civil rights activism did emerge. Lawrence Benn notes 
that the “sit-in” protest movement “that began in 1960 with four 
students at a Greensboro North Carolina lunch counter swelled 
to a force of 70,000.”135 By the end of 1960, the sit-in 
movement had spread to every Southern and Border state.136 
That same year, the students who led the sit-ins formed the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which conducted 
the Freedom Rides the next summer.137 In the spring of 1963 
massive street protests broke out in Birmingham, Alabama.138 In 
the months following, spin-off demonstrations occurred in cities 
throughout the south, involving more than 100,000 people.139 In 
the summer of 1963, more than 250,000 people attended the 
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in which King 
                                                          
133 Id. at 373. 
134 Id. at 374–76. By endorsing the view that several societal factors 
independent of Brown contributed to the growth of the civil rights movement 
in the early 1960s, I do not mean to embrace the notion that “progress in 
race relations [was] almost inevitable.” Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1764, 
n.81. I simply wish to emphasize the importance of other causal factors.  
135 Lawrence Benn, The Sit-In Cases and the Constitutional Legitimation 
of the Civil Rights Act (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Journal of Law and Policy). 
136 Id. at 2–7. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 374. 
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delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech, and millions 
more watched on television.140 If there was a popular signal of 
an intention to fundamentally alter the constitutional status of 
civil rights in America, surely it was the protests of the early 
1960s, not the opinion of nine aging white lawyers sitting on the 
Supreme Court in 1954. 
There is little evidence to support the claim that Brown 
prompted this popular uprising.141 Michael Klarman’s study of 
the fallout from Brown suggests that the decision did more to 
radicalize southern segregationists and promote violence around 
the issue,142 which in turn helped prompt the popular civil rights 
movement.143 The Brown decision may have served as a catalyst 
for the civil rights movement by provoking violent resistance, 
but this does not mean it was a popular signal of constitutional 
change. The ruling was neither the product of a popular 
movement, nor the cause of such a movement. Brown’s catalytic 
effect has more in common with the Dred Scott decision in 1858 
and the stock market crash in 1929—both of which raised 
awareness and provoked a public response—than it does with the 
presidential elections of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Although 
Warren’s opinion is distinct in that it shares rather than refutes 
the progressive attitude of the movement to come, this does not 
mean it was part of a popular movement that enjoyed depth, 
breadth, and decisiveness in the American public. 
Professor Ackerman’s depiction of Brown in the Holmes 
Lectures is particularly surprising because it differs so 
dramatically from his description of the ruling in his earlier 
work, We the People: Foundations. In Foundations, Ackerman 
                                                          
140 HANSEN, supra note 45. 
141 KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 374–77; see also Gerald Rosenberg, 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 107–
56 (1991). 
142 KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 421 (“[I]n addition to radicalizing 
southern politics in ways that enhanced the likelihood of racial violence, 
Brown created concrete occasions for such outbreaks.”). 
143 Id. at 435 (“Televised brutality against peaceful civil rights 
demonstrators in Birmingham dramatically altered northern opinion on race 
and enabled the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”). 
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describes the Court’s decision in Brown as “an intergenerational 
synthesis, an explicit recognition of the need to integrate the 
constitutional meaning of two historical periods in reaching a 
valid judgment.”144 On this account, the Court in Brown was 
trying to reconcile the Reconstruction Era commitment to 
prohibit racial subordination in political life with the New Deal’s 
acceptance of state intervention into matters previously left to 
individual choice: “Once the New Deal had authorized the 
state’s power to guarantee a retirement pension or a minimum 
wage, Justice Brown’s confident distinction between social and 
political equality [in Plessy v. Ferguson] was no longer 
tenable.”145 The New Deal expanded the application of 
Reconstruction principles into a greater sphere of social life by 
extending the legitimate reach of government action.146 The 
Court in Brown decided that, after the New Deal, the protections 
of the Fourteenth Amendment must be extended to public 
education,147 but the Court did not fully embrace the meaning of 
the civil rights movement. 
Ackerman’s two depictions of Brown—as an 
intergenerational synthesis case and a constitutional signal—are 
not incompatible. It is conceivable for the Court to act as a 
signal while simultaneously synthesizing two historical 
constitutional principles, but this is not what happened in Brown. 
In fact, Ackerman’s description of Brown in Foundations 
explicitly rejects his more recent description of the case in the 
Holmes lecture. In Foundations, Ackerman asserts that “Brown 
is a legalistic effort to ‘cool’ the debate, not a populist or 
prophetic effort to ‘heat’ it up.”148 It does not call upon the 
country to engage in a new round of constitutional politics; it 
tries to establish that the time had come for Americans to 
                                                          
144 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 60, at 144. 
145 Id. at 146. 
146 Id. at 147 (“The New Deal Court recognized the government as an 
active contributor to the process by which groups made their ‘choices’ in 
American society.”). 
147 Id. at 150 (“Within the new activist order, the schoolchild’s sense of 
racial inferiority had become a public responsibility, not a private choice.”). 
148 Id. at 143. 
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comply with legal principles already affirmed by the People of 
the past.”149 It is possible that Professor Ackerman has simply 
changed his mind since Foundations was published more than 
fifteen years ago. If so, my argument is an affirmation of 
Ackerman’s earlier reading of Brown in Foundations and a 
rejection of his more recent interpretation of Brown in the 
Holmes Lectures. 
III. SEARCHING FOR SUPER PRECEDENT 
The historical connection between Brown and the civil rights 
movement is tenuous at best; nonetheless, the canonization of 
Brown as a super precedent expressing the meaning of the civil 
rights movement might be justified if the civil rights movement 
vindicated the principles articulated in this decision. Did the 
Court’s opinion in Brown endorse the same constitutional 
principles that would later be embraced by the 1960s civil rights 
movement?  There are many reasons to believe it did not. A 
brief comparison of the principles in Brown and those 
emphasized by the civil rights movement highlights the problems 
of treating Brown as an articulation of that movement. However, 
such a comparison requires identifying textual sources apart 
from Brown that reflect the meaning of the civil rights 
revolution. Without a constitutional amendment or a 
transformative judicial opinion to serve as a super precedent, 
where can we turn to look for a clear pronouncement of civil 
rights principles? The search for suitable texts must begin with 
the legal pathology that led to Brown’s improper canonization. 
Ackerman points out that the form of constitutional 
articulation from a popular movement is dependent on the 
institutional positions of reformers vis-à-vis dissenters.150 The 
Radical Republicans wrote constitutional amendments to 
establish the Reconstruction movement because the White House 
was occupied by a southern Democrat; President Andrew 
Johnson could not be trusted to appoint Radical Republican 
                                                          
149 Id. at 143 (emphasis in original). 
150 TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41, at 271–73. 
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judges who could write transformative judicial opinions.151 As a 
result, we have no great super precedents articulating the 
Reconstruction movement. Instead, we have the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.152 
The New Deal Democrats did not suffer from this dilemma. 
With Franklin Roosevelt in the Oval Office, they could threaten 
to pack the Court and eventually appoint New Deal Democrats 
to write judicial opinions upholding their landmark statutes.153 As 
a result, we do not have constitutional amendments from the 
New Deal era; we have only landmark statutes and super 
precedent judicial decisions.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the 
Democrat-dominated congress passed numerous statutes striving 
to fundamentally alter the role of the federal government: the 
Social Security Act,154 the National Labor Relations Act,155 and 
the Fair Labor Standards Act,156 to name just a few. In 
upholding these statutes the Court marked out a decidedly new 
direction for constitutional law by acknowledging the 
transformation of constitutional principles after the New Deal.157 
These decisions serve as super precedents because they articulate 
the new constitutional meaning legitimated through popular 
mobilization during the 1930s.158 
Unfortunately, the civil rights era did not produce similar 
super precedent judicial rulings. In the months before the civil 
rights coalition in Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
                                                          
151 Id. at 273 (“The ‘court-packing’ issue looked very different to the 
Republicans after the Civil War. Once Johnson defected from the reform 
coalition in 1866, he was intent on filling vacancies with solid conservatives 
who would invalidate the Reconstruction Acts and sabotage the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
152 Id. at 269. 
153 Id. at 272 (“Instead of pushing forward under Article Five, [the New 
Dealers] could appoint a steady flow of New Dealers to the bench who could 
uphold revolutionary reforms through a series of landmark judicial 
opinions.”). 
154 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–1397 (1935). 
155 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151–169 (1935). 
156 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201–219 (1938). 
157 TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41, at 315. 
158 See generally id. at Part III. 
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and a very different President Johnson signed it into law, the 
Supreme Court struggled to dispose of Bell v. Maryland,159 a 
case that squarely presented the question of private 
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Bell, the 
justices were asked whether sit-in protesters could be arrested 
for trespassing in a public restaurant if they were not welcome 
in the restaurant due to their race.160 The issue revealed a 
complicated split on the Court that is eerily reminiscent of the 
New Deal split. This time, the Four Horsemen161 resisting 
change were Justices Black, Harlan, Stewart, and White. 
Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Brennan, as well as Chief 
Justice Warren, supported extending the logic of Shelley v. 
Kraemer,162 which had forbidden judicial enforcement of racially 
restrictive covenants, to the sit-in cases.163 Justice Clark, 
somewhat tentatively, opposed extending the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s definition of state action to cover the enforcement 
of race-neutral trespassing laws.164 Although Justice Clark 
momentarily joined an opinion supporting such an extension of 
the Amendment, this was most likely a strategic ploy.165 Fearful 
that a ruling in Bell v. Maryland might doom the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Justice Brennan fashioned a compromise to side-
step the issue by avoiding a ruling on the merits.166 
When the Court was forced to rule on the constitutionality of 
the Civil Rights Act in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 
                                                          
159 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
160 Id. at 227–28. 
161 This phrase is short for “The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” and 
was used as a nickname for four members of the Supreme Court during the 
1932–1937 terms (Justices James Clark McReynolds, George Sutherland, 
Willis Van Devanter, and Pierce Butler), who consistently voted to block 
New Deal Legislation. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE NEW DEAL 19 (2000) (discussing usage of the phrase “Four 
Horsemen”). 
162 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
163 Benn, supra note 135, at 38. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 31. 
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the justices split once again.167 According to Justice Douglas’s 
conference notes, only three Justices supported an interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment that permitted Congress to 
regulate private racial discrimination—Justices Douglas, 
Goldberg, and Black.168 Some scholars claim that a majority may 
have supported overruling the Civil Rights Cases and upholding 
the Act on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, but, regardless of 
the outcome, the split would have protracted the constitutional 
debate.169 If a majority had struck down the Civil Rights Act in 
Heart of Atlanta, Congress and the president may have 
responded with an attack on the Court or waited to make 
transformative judicial appointments. If a majority had upheld 
the Act over a strong dissent it may have provided 
encouragement to those resisting the movement. Either way, the 
Court would have eventually been forced to write an opinion 
articulating the constitutional transformation of the 1960s that 
would serve as a super precedent. 
Instead, the Court ducked the issue. As Ackerman puts it, 
“New Deal constitutionalism came to the rescue.”170 
Congressional supporters of the Civil Rights Act had cleverly 
based their authority for passing the Act on the Commerce 
Clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.171 The justices, all 
products of the post-New Deal era, were willing to uphold 
Congress’s authority based on the power granted in the 
Commerce Clause.172 As a result, rather than a transformative 
judicial opinion that could serve as a super precedent articulating 
the civil rights movement’s revolution in constitutional meaning, 
Heart of Atlanta turned out to be just another Commerce Clause 
case.173 As Ackerman puts it, if the Warren Court 
                                                          
167 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
168 Benn, supra note 135, at 47. 
169 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1780. 
170 Id. at 1781. 
171 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination or 
segregation in places of public accommodation). 
172 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250. 
173 Id. (“Our study of the legislative record, made in the light of prior 
cases, has brought us to the conclusion that Congress possessed ample power 
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. . . had overruled the Civil Rights Cases in 1964, Heart 
of Atlanta Motel and McClung would have eclipsed 
Brown in the modern constitutional canon. In this 
alternative scenario, today’s lawyers and judges would be 
studying these cases, not Brown, in their effort to 
elaborate the breakthrough principles of equal protection 
and state responsibility that served as the foundation of 
the landmark Act of 1964.174 
But after speculating on this alternative scenario, Ackerman 
fails to confront the pressing interpretive question raised by this 
hypothetical and its implications for Brown’s role as a 
constitutional signal: should we study Brown in order to 
understand the principles of equality and state action embraced 
by the civil rights legislation of the 1960s? If the focus on 
Brown is simply a consequence of the Court’s strategic move to 
avoid the issue, should we not turn our attention away from the 
Court towards a branch of government that was willing to 
articulate a new constitutional meaning? Fortunately, Congress 
provided clear, substantive meaning for the civil rights 
transformation in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.175 It is to these documents, not to Brown, 
that we should look when searching for super-precedent-like 
texts from this era. 
Ackerman admits that Brown is a case of “retroactive 
canonization,”176 but does not challenge the case’s status as a 
super precedent.  Instead, he incorporates the case into his five-
stage process in an attempt to salvage its interpretive 
importance.177 But again, the Ackerman of the Holmes Lectures 
can learn a great deal from the Ackerman of Foundations. Just 
as lawyers and scholars should be wary of myths of rediscovery 
                                                          
[based on the commerce clause], and we have therefore not considered the 
other grounds relied upon.”). 
174 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1779–80 (emphasis in original). 
175 See infra note 45. 
176 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1790. 
177 Id. at 176263 (“In calling Brown v. Board of Education an 
institutional signal, I take a middle path between legalists who exaggerate 
Brown’s significance and political scientists who trivialize it.”). 
HALL REVISED.DOC 6/28/2010  2:53 PM 
690 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
for the New Deal, we should be wary of the myth of 
rediscovery for the civil rights movement through retroactive 
canonization of Brown. 
The Court did not accept the meaning of the civil rights 
movement in Brown v. Board of Education; the Court effectively 
ducked the constitutional issue and punted the civil rights 
question to Congress in Heart of Atlanta. The Court’s clever 
strategy produced a politically palpable solution, but failed to 
produce a clear articulation of civil rights principles. Because 
Heart of Atlanta was decided on Commerce Clause grounds 
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional scholars 
have reached back to Brown in search of a more meaningful 
statement of these principles from the Court.178 The fact that the 
justices could authorize the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on New 
Deal logic is the main reason there were no protracted legal 
battles, followed by transformative judicial opinions in the 
1960s; however, transformative judicial opinions are no more 
necessary for a successful constitutional transformation than are 
formal Article V amendments. Rather than mythologize the 
Warren Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the 
search for an articulation of civil rights principles embraced by 
the American people in the 1960s should focus on the protests 
that signaled the coming constitutional transformation and the 
landmark statutes enacted to achieve that transformation. 
IV. BROWN AND THE MEANING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
The Court’s decision in Brown followed a relatively simple 
line of argument: (1) the history of the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is “inconclusive” in determining the 
constitutionality of school segregation;179 (2) the Fourteenth 
Amendment proscribes “all state-imposed discriminations against 
the Negro race”180; (3) at the time the Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                          
178 See, e.g. Ackerman, supra note 21. 
179 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 
483, 489 (1954). 
180 Id. at 490. 
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was passed, “the movement toward free common schools, 
supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold” in the 
southern states, but by 1954 “education [was] perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments”;181 
(4) separating out African-American students in public schools 
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely to be undone”;182 (5) this “psychological knowledge,” 
which is “amply supported by modern authority,” compels the 
Court to clarify the language of Plessy and hold that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”183 The central 
principles in this line of argument are the importance of 
education as a state sponsored activity, the psychological damage 
of segregation in schools, and the imperative against state action 
that contributes to a racial group’s inferior status in the 
community. Were these the central themes of the civil rights 
movement? 
No one source can properly claim to speak for the civil 
rights movement.184 There are several historical sources, though, 
which shed light on the intentions of civil rights activists during 
this period. For example, Klarman notes the disconnect between 
the logic of Brown and the motivation of the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott in December of 1955: “At the outset of the boycott, 
black leaders repeatedly stressed that they were not seeking an 
end to segregation, which would have been the logical goal had 
Brown been their primary inspiration.”185 Klarman also 
                                                          
181 Id. at 489, 493. 
182 Id. at 494. 
183 Id. at 494–95. 
184 In fact, my central argument is to discredit one potential source, 
Brown v. Board of Education, as an accurate articulation of this movement. 
185 KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 371 (“[P]rotesters . . . principally 
sought an end to the humiliating practices of white bus drivers, including 
verbal insults . . . physical abuse, and an enraging proclivity to drive off 
before black passengers, who had to pay the fare at the front of the bus, had 
boarded again at the rear . . . . At the outset of the boycott, black leaders 
repeatedly stressed that they were not seeking an end to segregation, which 
would have been the logical goal had Brown been their primary 
inspiration.”). 
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emphasizes the disjuncture between the goals stressed in the 
Brown decision and those of the larger movement. Whites in the 
1950s fervently opposed desegregation; “[b]lacks, conversely, 
were often much more interested in voting, ending police 
brutality, securing decent jobs, and receiving a fair share of 
public education funds than in desegregating grade schools.”186 
Based on this history, reading Brown as a super precedent 
articulating the meaning of the civil rights movement seems 
particularly troubling. 
Many civil rights advocates continued to downplay the 
importance of school desegregation for the civil rights movement 
well into the 1960s. Consider, for example, Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s “I Have Dream” speech, delivered at the March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963. The title of the 
march itself points out an initial difficulty with the link to 
Brown: where were jobs in the logic of Brown? Warren’s 
opinion talks about the importance of education for society, the 
logic of state action in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fear 
of psychological harm to young children.187 How do these 
themes apply to job opportunities in the private sector for 
adults? 
King’s speech offers a rich source of meaning for the civil 
rights movement. Halfway through his speech, King summarizes 
his goals: “There are those who are asking the devotees of civil 
rights, ‘When will you be satisfied?’”188 King responds to the 
rhetorical question with a list of injustices the movement hopes 
to end: “unspeakable horrors of police brutality” against 
African-Americans, the inability of African-Americans to “gain 
lodging in motels of the highways and hotels of the cities,” the 
restriction of mobility within the African-American community 
“from a smaller ghetto to a larger one, “signs stating ‘for whites 
only,’” and the lack of voting rights.189 Schools are never 
mentioned in the entire speech, and the allusion to segregation 
                                                          
186 Id. at 391–92. 
187 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (1954). 
188 HANSEN, supra note 45, at 56. 
189 Id. at 56–57. 
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(“signs stating ‘for whites only’”) is obviously aimed at public 
accommodations, such as bathrooms, restaurants, hotels, and 
drinking fountains where such signs were posted. Not only was 
this issue distinct from school segregation, but it was also an 
injustice perpetuated as much, if not more, by the private sector 
as by state actors. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers another description of 
the movement’s objectives. The preamble to the act succinctly 
lists its purposes:  
To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer 
jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States 
to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in 
public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney 
General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in 
public facilities and public education, to extend the 
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in 
federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission 
on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other 
purposes.190 
Here, we see the appearance of school desegregation as a 
main purpose of the Act, and presumably of the movement 
itself; however, it is listed as only one of several, and certainly 
not the most controversial. In numerous areas, the act reaches 
beyond mere state action and addresses discrimination in hotels, 
restaurants, theaters, stadiums, private industry employment, 
and union membership.191 Subsequent civil rights legislation 
focused on voting rights and fair housing practices, neither of 
which bears any direct relationship to the reasoning in Brown.192 
Most importantly, the civil rights movement of the 1960s 
vindicated a very different set of principles than those articulated 
in the Brown decision.  Whereas the justices in Brown avoided 
language referring to racial classifications or distinctions, the 
civil rights movement frequently articulated its purposes and 
accomplishments in explicitly anti-classification terms. For 
                                                          
190 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
191 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(b). 
192 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, Pub. L. No. 89–110. 
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example, in his “I Have a Dream” speech, Martin Luther King, 
Jr. proclaimed the hope that his children would “not be judged 
by the color of their skin.”193 Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 defined desegregation as “the assignment of students to 
public schools and within such schools without regard to their 
race, color, religion, or national origin.”194 The Act repeatedly 
condemns actions taken which “discriminate,” “exclude,” 
“limit, segregate, or classify” “on account” of race, “by reason 
of race,” “because of race,” “on the ground of race,” “based on 
race,” or “on the basis of race.”195 The Act makes no mention of 
racial groups, disadvantaged or otherwise, nor does it suggest 
preferential treatment for particular racial groups in order to 
address their subjugated status in society. 
In fact, the Act explicitly rejects the use of race-conscious 
criteria aimed at promoting integration. The Act’s definition of 
desegregation specifies that the term “shall not mean the 
assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome 
racial imbalance.”196 In the critical section of Title IV, which 
empowers the Attorney General to file a civil action on behalf of 
the United States to desegregate public schools, the authors 
reiterated their rejection of racial balancing. The Act authorizes 
the Attorney General to institute a civil action in federal court to 
achieve desegregation: 
provided that nothing herein shall empower any official 
or court of the United States to issue any order seeking 
to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the 
transportation of pupils or students from one school to 
another or one school district to another in order to 
achieve such racial balance.197 
These passages were included at the behest of pivotal 
moderate Republicans like Everett Dirksen, whose support was 
                                                          
193 HANSEN, supra note 45, at 58. 
194 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 401(b). 
195 Id. 
196 Civil Rights Act § 401(b). 
197 Id. § 407 (a)(2). 
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critical for the bill’s enactment.198 These moderate Republicans 
demanded these concessions from ardent supporters of the bill in 
order to limit its impact on de facto segregation in the North and 
prevent courts from engaging in racial balancing.199 Even the 
ardent supporters of the bill acknowledged these concessions.200 
Senator Hubert Humphrey, speaking on the Senate floor, 
emphasized the bill’s rejection of racial balancing in Title VII, 
which adopted similar language in regards to employment: 
“Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, 
there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission 
or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of 
employees in order to meet the racial ‘quota’ or to achieve a 
certain racial balance.”201 In fact, the bill’s floor managers, 
Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, insisted that “any deliberate 
attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance 
may be, would involve a violation of Title VII.”202  Surely this 
same logic would apply to the equally explicit rejection of racial 
balancing in school desegregation. Not only does the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 fail to endorse race-conscious measures to 
combat racial subordination, it was construed by its proponents 
to forbid such a practice. 
V. THE MALADIES OF MYTH 
In this article, I have tried to demonstrate that the 
canonization of Brown as a super precedent lacks democratic 
legitimacy, misrepresents history, and reduces the meaning of 
the civil rights movement to state action in elementary and 
secondary education. However, the implications of Brown’s 
mistaken canonization extend well beyond democratic theory and 
                                                          
198 Daniel B. Rodriquez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political 
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspective on the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and its Interpretation, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1417, 1474–94 (2003). 
199 Id. at 1488. 
200 HIGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, 85 (1990). 
201 Id at 150. 
202 Id at 150–51. 
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historical accuracy. By accepting the myth of rediscovery that 
enshrines Brown in our constitutional discourse we do not 
simply misinterpret history; we misinterpret the meaning of the 
constitutional decision made by the American people during the 
1960s. Disentangling the principles articulated in Brown from 
those endorsed by the civil rights movement sheds light on the 
fundamental debate that has defined equal protection 
jurisprudence for the last four decades: anticlassification versus 
antisubordination. 
The arguments advanced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Breyer in Parents v. Seattle are hampered and confused by their 
mutual acceptance of Brown’s super precedent status.203 Chief 
Justice Roberts works diligently in his opinion to link 
anticlassification principles to the Brown decision, but this effort 
is ultimately fruitless because it is ahistorical.204 The principles to 
which the Chief Justice subscribes were not established in Brown 
v. Board of Education; they were established through a process 
of constitutional deliberation beginning with the sit-in protests of 
the early 1960s and culminating in the passage of the landmark 
statutes securing basic civil rights. As anticlassification 
principles garnered the support of the American people, courts 
began to reframe equal protection jurisprudence to reflect those 
values.205 By the 1970s anticlassification became the dominant 
framework for applying the Equal Protection Clause.206 Despite 
gaining popular endorsement of anticlassification values, 
adherents to these principles have tried to recast the meaning of 
Brown in order to harmonize the myth of its super precedent 
status with the anticlassification agenda. 
Justice Breyer’s depiction of Brown’s meaning is more 
historically accurate and textually faithful; however, Justice 
Breyer’s opinion simply props up the myth of Brown in order to 
                                                          
203 See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
204 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 746–47 (2007). 
205 See generally Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402–04 (1964); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190–92, 196 (1964); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 10–12 (1967). 
206 Siegel, supra note 27, at 1521. 
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support his antisubordination views.207 In so doing, he pays 
insufficient attention to the act of constitutional deliberation that 
ultimately vindicated anticlassification principles during the 
1960s. By employing a court-centered view of constitutional 
decision making, Justice Breyer is able to portray the 
anticlassification agenda as an aberration of misguided judicial 
interpretation rather than a popularly endorsed constitutional 
principle. He is ultimately correct in arguing that Brown and 
many of its progeny vindicated antisubordination values, but he 
is mistaken in his implicit assumption that the Brown decision 
deserves super precedent status. 
The myth of rediscovery that protects Brown’s exalted status 
obscures the significance of the interpretive constitutional 
process at work in cases considering preferential treatment for 
disadvantaged racial groups. To once again borrow language 
from Bruce Ackerman, these cases are best understood as 
examples of intergenerational synthesis.208 Just as Brown 
reconciled Reconstruction commitments with New Deal 
principles, the justices in Parents are attempting to reconcile 
Reconstruction values with the anticlassification principles 
endorsed by the civil rights movement.209 Rather than framing 
the debate between anticlassification and antisubordination values 
as a struggle over the meaning of Brown, judges, lawyers, and 
legal scholars should strive to grapple with the interpretive and 
jurisprudential challenge of reconciling these popularly endorsed 
constitutional principles. 
Adherents to antisubordination values may find this 
interpretation of the civil rights movement disheartening, but 
they should not. As Ackerman has pointed out, the myth of 
rediscovery offers politically expedient benefits at the cost of 
democratic courage.210 By obsessively trying to reinvent the past 
                                                          
207 See supra notes 33–35, 39–40 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 144. 
209 Ackerman would call this interpretive dynamic a 2-4 synthesis. See 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 60, for his use of analogous language. 
210 Ackerman, supra note 21, 1803–09 (“The same disease currently 
afflicts American constitutional law. Our most important fiction involves the 
pervasive use of ‘myths of rediscovery’ . . . . We dishonor our fellow 
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in order to promote modern objectives, we rob ourselves of the 
most fundamental democratic principle: the right of the people to 
break with the past and establish new fundamental values for our 
society.211 The anticlassification principles vindicated by the civil 
rights movement may frustrate the proponents of racial 
balancing in schools, but a shift in focus from Brown to the 
constitutional revolution of the 1960s should offer inspiration to 
advocates for change across the political spectrum. Those who 
hope to reshape the structure of American society need neither 
reinvent history in search of precedent, nor enlist the service of 
nine old lawyers. The power to change our society rests safely 
with the People; this power is only obscured when we discount 
the achievements of previous popular movements. In this way, 
the disservice we do to history is ultimately a disservice to 
ourselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The proponents of civil rights during the 1960s were hoping 
for much more than the end of state-sponsored racial segregation 
in public education, and their primary concern was certainly not 
with the “psychological” effects of racial oppression.212 The civil 
rights movement strove for and achieved the delegitimation of 
racial discrimination that caused tangible damage to African-
                                                          
citizens when we tell them a tale that treats their parents and grandparents as 
if they were pygmies compared to the constitutional giants of the ever-
receding past. We should offer them instead a view of constitutional 
development that invites them to follow in the footsteps of Franklin Roosevelt 
and Martin Luther King, Jr.—to dream their own Dreams and make their 
own New Deals, and to build a better America in the twenty-first century.”). 
211 Id. 
212 See generally GRAHAM, supra note 200 (analyzing the implementation 
of the liberal agenda of non-discrimination through the recreation of the 
debates within Congress and the White House); KLARMAN, supra note 132 
(discussing how the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education mobilized supporters of non-discrimination); RODRIQUEZ & 
WEINGAST, supra note 198 (utilizing the Civil Rights Act as a “vehicle for 
considering statute making, legislative rhetoric, and the relevance of our 
views to the current normative debate over statutory interpretation”). 
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American opportunities across the entire society, especially in 
public accommodations, housing, employment, and voting, as 
well as in public education. Furthermore, the proponents of the 
civil rights movement tended to employ the language of 
anticlassification when articulating their goals and when enacting 
these objectives into law.213 I do not mean to suggest that school 
desegregation was not an important goal of the civil rights 
movement. I only claim that focusing on Brown as the 
articulation of that movement obscures the true meanings of both 
the movement and Brown. 
Brown v. Board of Education should not be considered a 
super precedent because it was not a product of the mobilized 
popular movement that grasped control of the levers of 
government and transformed the meaning of the constitution. 
The special place of super precedents in constitutional law 
should be reserved for judicial pronouncements that articulate 
changed constitutional meanings after protracted popular 
disputes. The Brown decision is neither an accurate reflection of 
the full meaning of the civil rights movement, nor is it an 
historical byproduct of that movement. 
By rejecting Brown’s status as a super precedent, I do not 
mean to claim that the case was not important.214 Nor do I mean 
                                                          
213 See supra Part IV. 
214 There are, undoubtedly, numerous opinions that signal a significant 
departure from established jurisprudence, yet are not the product of a 
mobilized popular movement seizing control of the various arms of the state. 
In each of the cases below, the Supreme Court established a principle of 
constitutional interpretation which shaped jurisprudence in a particular area of 
case law for years to come; yet, for most of these cases, no one would assert 
that the Court’s decision reflected and articulated the conscious decision of a 
popular movement engaged in an act of higher lawmaking. These noteworthy 
rulings should be taught in classrooms and studied carefully, but they should 
not be confused with super precedents. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969) (finding an Ohio statute unconstitutional under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments for failing to distinguish between teaching a group 
the need for violence and preparing a group for violent action); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right of privacy implicit in the 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961) (holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
extended to the States the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
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to criticize the central holding in Brown.215 My point is that 
treating Brown as a super precedent undermines the conceptual 
value of super precedents and the historical understanding of the 
civil rights movement. Confusing a high-minded act of 
intergenerational legal synthesis with the articulation of a 
popular political movement does a disservice to the normative 
value of super precedents; confusing the decision of nine judges 
with a popular signal from a broad movement of students, 
ministers, and activists does a disservice to the history of the 
civil rights era. 
 
                                                          
searches and seizures); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(declaring state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white 
students unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ruling that the general right to contract and the 
right to purchase or sell labor is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); 
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (one of Ackerman’s 
intergenerational synthesis cases). 
215 Criticizing a case’s status as a super precedent and criticizing the 
merits of the Court’s decision in the case are two very different arguments; 
there are undoubtedly thousands of rightly decided cases that are not super 
precedents. 
